What’s Next in the Iran-Israel Conflict: War, Peace, or Revolution?

Hosts

Derek ThompsonDerek Thompson

About the episode

Summary

• In the following transcript, Derek and Ray Takeyh discuss the U.S.’s decision to bomb Iran.

  Derek Thompson: We are speaking on Tuesday, and in just the last few days, Israel has bombed Iran. Iran has responded by sending missiles into Israel. America has bombed Iran. Iran has attacked a U.S. airbase in Qatar. A tentative ceasefire was announced by President Trump and almost immediately melted upon contact with reality. Israel at this moment of our speaking, has resumed pounding Iran with bombs. Before we unpack strategy, motivations, the path forward … How would you summarize what’s just transpired in the last few days in Iran?

  Ray Takeyh: Well, on the one side, it was a moment that a lot of people anticipated, because for 20 years we’ve been talking about who and when somebody will bomb Iran. Prime Minister Netanyahu has been talking about this all along, and so has everybody else—but when the moment came, it was still an extraordinary one. I don’t know what exactly it means for the United States and Israel, but it’s a transformative moment for the Islamic Republic of Iran. Moving forward, its internal politics and strategic calculations will actually be quite different.

  Thompson: Before this weekend, no U.S. president had ever bombed Iran in a conventional military airstrike. And here we have Donald Trump, a man who distinguished himself in the 2016 primary by criticizing George W. Bush’s war in the Middle East, now becoming the first president to bomb Iran. How do you make sense of the fact that this isn’t just any president making history in this moment, it is Donald Trump?

  Takeyh: You mean, how did the neocon globalists get into the Trump administration?

  Thompson: Sure, yeah. How was his mind infected by the very ideology that he in part became popular by opposing?

  Takeyh: Well, on the one side, there were U.S.-Iran negotiations going on during his time with Steve Witkoff leading those talks. The deadline was compressed and the demands were maximal, and so it was the usual kind of tempo that the president wants. On the other side, I think once the Israeli attack came and it appeared to be successful, then there was an opportunity to join a successful enterprise. If you recall, the very first statement made by the Trump administration came from Secretary Marco Rubio, and he essentially said, we’re not involved with this, we don’t know about this, and so on. There was essentially a disclaimer. But once the Israeli strike became successful in terms of his operational dexterity, then the president decided to join the successful enterprise. At first, he said, “These are American weapons, the American weapons were great.” Then, of course, came the attack on the photo nuclear installation.

  Thompson: I’m joking a little bit when I say he’s been mind-infected by the neocon ideology. In a way, he’s only been half infected because he sends the bombers over, they bomb these nuclear technology sites, and then mere hours later, he just goes onto Truth Social, declares a ceasefire that maybe neither party was particularly serious about, and so he’s simultaneously declaring a kind of war and announcing a kind of peace. It’s a very strange blend of foreign policy ideologies. How do you make sense of that?

  Takeyh: Well, it’s not the conventional way of doing things, if that’s what you mean, but there’s nothing conventional about the second Trump administration. Essentially, it’s even a departure from the first Trump administration, and the whole thing about the president is that he is capable of unpredictable action. He always said you don’t know what I’m going to do, you don’t know what I’m not going to do. I’m going to war, I’m going to take a ceasefire. I’m going to rebuild Gaza. So it has to do with that particular temperament, I suspect. I can’t explain it in its totality because it’s outside the sort of mainstream way of thinking about this, but that’s just the way things are going nowadays.

  Thompson: What do you think was the expected value in the U.S. bombing these sites in particular? I mean, the U.S. and Israel have in the past used a variety of tools to blunt the Iran nuclear program. They’ve used sanctions, they’ve used cyberattacks. There’ve been assassinations of Iran’s nuclear personnel, and yet time over time, Iran just keeps building back toward this nuclear threshold. What seems to have been the strategy here with this aerial bombing campaign? Why now?

  Takeyh: Why now? Because, as I said, the Israeli success presented a unique opportunity for the (U.S.) interest. The other aspect of it is the sanctions, sabotage, targeted assassinations. There was a perception that they had failed to retard the Iranian nuclear program. It had kept moving forward, and there were a lot of problematic features about it, enriching to 60 percent for which there’s no real civilian purpose. And recently, actually in May, Iran was rebuked by the International Atomic Energy Agency for its lack of cooperation with inspection regime. So there was a feeling that this program is beginning to defy its confines.

  I would say, and it has to be said, that it was a judgment of the American Intelligence Services as presented by Tulsi Gabbard that the program had many problematic features in it, but it was not being misused for weaponization purposes. Now, some people say that’s a distinction without difference—an expanding nuclear program gives you the option to weaponize even if your intentions have not been made clear. But it was not a program. It was a program that was expanding in disturbing ways, but as far as one knows, it was not on the urge of weaponization.

  Derek Thompson: We are speaking on Tuesday, and in just the last few days, Israel has bombed Iran. Iran has responded by sending missiles into Israel. America has bombed Iran. Iran has attacked a U.S. airbase in Qatar. A tentative ceasefire was announced by President Trump and almost immediately melted upon contact with reality. Israel at this moment of our speaking, has resumed pounding Iran with bombs. Before we unpack strategy, motivations, the path forward … How would you summarize what’s just transpired in the last few days in Iran?

  Ray Takeyh: Well, on the one side, it was a moment that a lot of people anticipated, because for 20 years we’ve been talking about who and when somebody will bomb Iran. Prime Minister Netanyahu has been talking about this all along, and so has everybody else—but when the moment came, it was still an extraordinary one. I don’t know what exactly it means for the United States and Israel, but it’s a transformative moment for the Islamic Republic of Iran. Moving forward, its internal politics and strategic calculations will actually be quite different.

  Thompson: Before this weekend, no U.S. president had ever bombed Iran in a conventional military airstrike. And here we have Donald Trump, a man who distinguished himself in the 2016 primary by criticizing George W. Bush’s war in the Middle East, now becoming the first president to bomb Iran. How do you make sense of the fact that this isn’t just any president making history in this moment, it is Donald Trump?

  Takeyh: You mean, how did the neocon globalists get into the Trump administration?

  Thompson: Sure, yeah. How was his mind infected by the very ideology that he in part became popular by opposing?

  Takeyh: Well, on the one side, there were U.S.-Iran negotiations going on during his time with Steve Witkoff leading those talks. The deadline was compressed and the demands were maximal, and so it was the usual kind of tempo that the president wants. On the other side, I think once the Israeli attack came and it appeared to be successful, then there was an opportunity to join a successful enterprise. If you recall, the very first statement made by the Trump administration came from Secretary Marco Rubio, and he essentially said, we’re not involved with this, we don’t know about this, and so on. There was essentially a disclaimer. But once the Israeli strike became successful in terms of his operational dexterity, then the president decided to join the successful enterprise. At first, he said, “These are American weapons, the American weapons were great.” Then, of course, came the attack on the photo nuclear installation.

  Thompson: I’m joking a little bit when I say he’s been mind-infected by the neocon ideology. In a way, he’s only been half infected because he sends the bombers over, they bomb these nuclear technology sites, and then mere hours later, he just goes onto Truth Social, declares a ceasefire that maybe neither party was particularly serious about, and so he’s simultaneously declaring a kind of war and announcing a kind of peace. It’s a very strange blend of foreign policy ideologies. How do you make sense of that?

  Takeyh: Well, it’s not the conventional way of doing things, if that’s what you mean, but there’s nothing conventional about the second Trump administration. Essentially, it’s even a departure from the first Trump administration, and the whole thing about the president is that he is capable of unpredictable action. He always said you don’t know what I’m going to do, you don’t know what I’m not going to do. I’m going to war, I’m going to take a ceasefire. I’m going to rebuild Gaza. So it has to do with that particular temperament, I suspect. I can’t explain it in its totality because it’s outside the sort of mainstream way of thinking about this, but that’s just the way things are going nowadays.

  Thompson: What do you think was the expected value in the U.S. bombing these sites in particular? I mean, the U.S. and Israel have in the past used a variety of tools to blunt the Iran nuclear program. They’ve used sanctions, they’ve used cyberattacks. There’ve been assassinations of Iran’s nuclear personnel, and yet time over time, Iran just keeps building back toward this nuclear threshold. What seems to have been the strategy here with this aerial bombing campaign? Why now?

  Takeyh: Why now? Because, as I said, the Israeli success presented a unique opportunity for the (U.S.) interest. The other aspect of it is the sanctions, sabotage, targeted assassinations. There was a perception that they had failed to retard the Iranian nuclear program. It had kept moving forward, and there were a lot of problematic features about it, enriching to 60 percent for which there’s no real civilian purpose. And recently, actually in May, Iran was rebuked by the International Atomic Energy Agency for its lack of cooperation with inspection regime. So there was a feeling that this program is beginning to defy its confines.

  I would say, and it has to be said, that it was a judgment of the American Intelligence Services as presented by Tulsi Gabbard that the program had many problematic features in it, but it was not being misused for weaponization purposes. Now, some people say that’s a distinction without difference—an expanding nuclear program gives you the option to weaponize even if your intentions have not been made clear. But it was not a program. It was a program that was expanding in disturbing ways, but as far as one knows, it was not on the urge of weaponization.

  This excerpt has been edited and condensed.
  

  Host: Derek Thompson
  Guest: Ray Takeyh
  Producer: Devon Baroldi